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Chapter 6
Enhancing Safety Performance:
Non-technical Skills and a Modicum
of Chronic Unease
Rhona Flin
Abstract Current debates on professionalism and safety cover a range of inter-
pretative challenges and theoretical perspectives, as the workshop organized by
FonCSI in 2015 revealed. One avenue for consideration was to address the question
of the role of professionalism in the job with regard to safety. For example, should
safety training just be part of normal job training or should it have a separate and
distinctive position in the training curriculum? In this paper, I consider two ways in
which safety training and safety thinking are being integrated into routine man-
agerial and technical work. The ﬁrst of these is behavioural, namely to focus on the
non-technical skills (NTS) for a given job, as evidenced by the airlines’ Crew
Resource Management training and assessment programmes. This approach is now
being adopted in other safety-critical sectors, such as acute medicine and offshore
oil and gas operations. The second direction is more attitudinal in nature: it
examines the relatively novel concept of chronic unease, derived from the High
Reliability Organisation literature. These two approaches show that addressing both
workplace behaviours (non-technical skills) and underlying attitudes to operational
risks (chronic unease), can help to build protective skills for safety into the pro-
fessional job repertoire.
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6.1 Introduction
The opening position statement for the FonCSI workshop1 (see Introduction by
Gilbert) came from a concern of the member companies, namely that training
programmes in the ﬁeld of industrial safety no longer appear to be yielding the
expected results. This contribution is primarily directed at questions proposed for
the FonCSI workshop on professionalism and safety
What part could professionalism in the job play in safety? Should safety training be
incorporated into everyday practices and activities or should there be speciﬁc safety
training? (Foncsi 2015)
The reason for choosing this topic is that much of my research has been founded,
perhaps implicitly at times, on the assumption that enhancing job performance so
that it is of better quality and efﬁciency will concomitantly enhance safety due to
improved risk perception and risk management behaviours.
In this chapter, I ﬁrst briefly discuss what I understand the term ‘professionalism’
to mean. It is not a topic I have ever studied and so I have attempted to set out my
interpretation of how professionalism relates to workplace safety. I then discuss two
areas where my own safety research has been located. These indicate two ways in
which safety training and safety thinking can be integrated into routine work, at
both operator and managerial levels. The ﬁrst is behavioural, namely to focus on the
non-technical skills for a given job, as evidenced by the airlines’ Crew Resource
Management training and assessment programmes. This approach is now being
adopted in other safety-critical sectors, such as acute medicine and offshore oil and
gas operations, typical for operational staff but in some cases also for managers. The
second direction is more attitudinal in nature: it examines the relatively novel
concept of chronic unease, derived from the High Reliability Organisation litera-
ture. This has been used at both operational and managerial levels. What is pro-
posed is that addressing both non-technical skills, as well as underlying attitudes to
operational risks (chronic unease), can help to build protective skills for safety into
the professional job repertoire.
6.2 What Is Professionalism?
What does ‘professionalism’ in the job mean? Is it about having deﬁned standards,
speciﬁed programmes of education and qualiﬁcation monitored by subject matter
experts? The term ‘profession’ has a long history, traditionally referring to specialist
occupations based on an extensive body of knowledge, such as law, divinity or
medicine which have controlled qualiﬁcations and speciﬁed training leading to
1The two-day international workshop mentioned in the preface, organized by FonCSI in November
2015 and highlight of the project that led to this book (editors’ note).
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membership of the professional body. Professionalism is a newer conceptualisation,
reflecting an extended range of occupations now seen as professions and the idea of
‘professional standards/professional behaviour’ being seen as part of many modern
jobs. Sociologists have engaged in extended debate about professionalism versus
managerialism, normative versus ideological interpretations, the rise of profes-
sionalism and its implications for organisational life (Evetts 2003; Noordegraaf
2011). In relation to safety, we can distinguish between:
1. the increasing professionalization of the safety specialist, in the form of the
safety adviser or safety manager and
2. embodying an additional focus on safety into the skills of the technical
professional.
In relation to the ﬁrst point, it is important to recognise that the safety specialists
have a valuable role in many organisations, especially with regard to regulatory
compliance, large scale audit, and design and implementation of safety management
systems. My own work has been more concerned with the second approach.
Namely, trying to identify how an appropriate skill set for enhancing safety can be
identiﬁed so that this can be incorporated into professional development (whether
technical or managerial).
6.3 Crew Resource Management and Non-technical Skills
One of the most obvious demonstrations of this approach of trying to build safety
skills into general professional competence is Crew Resource Management (CRM).
This is a training approach introduced by the aviation industry in the 1980s, fol-
lowing the realisation that a focus on technical skills was not sufﬁcient. Accident
analyses, which greatly beneﬁtted from cockpit voice recorders, showed clearly that
deﬁciencies in teamwork, leadership, decision making, situation awareness and
communication were contributing to adverse events (Kanki et al. 2010). Of course,
this was not to say that organisational factors, managerial behaviours, company
culture and work conditions were not also exerting a powerful influence on air-
worthiness, technical reliability and flightdeck behaviours (Maurino et al. 1995).
Notwithstanding these powerful influences on the behaviours of front-line staff, the
personnel closest to the hazards may have the opportunity to enhance or diminish
the level of flight safety by their actions. Their behaviour can increase exposure to
risk (e.g. rule violation) or can be protective (e.g. by monitoring, and if necessary
challenging, the actions of other crew members).
Task analyses using interviews, surveys, simulator observations and accident
analyses were employed to identify pilots’ CRM skills, which were essentially
protective for safety, by reducing the incidence of error or by ‘catching’ or miti-
gating errors that occurred. Errors jeopardise efﬁciency, as well as safety. Improved
communication enables smoother interaction between crew members and
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supporting personnel. Awareness of human performance limiting factors, such as
stress and fatigue results in better self-monitoring and corrective action. Having
determined the principal skill set, classroom and simulator-based training courses,
called CRM training, were devised to teach pilots (and subsequently cabin crew and
aviation engineers) the basic knowledge of the psychological principles underlying
these non-technical skills and to show why the associated behaviours were pro-
tective for flight safety.
In European aviation, the regulator (JAA2 at the time) when discussing Crew
Resource Management introduced the term ‘non-technical skills’, essentially the
cognitive and social skills that complemented the pilot’s technical skills and
enhanced efﬁciency and safety (Flin et al. 2008). The teaching and assessment of
non-technical skills is obligatory for airline pilots in most countries. For example, in
the UK, the Kegworth plane crash in 1989 (where British Midland pilots mistakenly
shut off the working engine when the other was on ﬁre) was such a strong
demonstration that human error and teamwork failures were contributing to fatal
accidents, that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) took the view that CRM had to
be introduced, even though at the time there were only a few scientiﬁc studies on its
effectiveness. In the ensuing years, there have been many advances in CRM training
and in 2015 the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) released new guid-
ance on Crew Resource Management (EASA 2015), an example of which is shown
below.
CRM training should be conducted in the non-operational environment (classroom and
computer-based) and in the operational environment (flight simulation training device
(FSTD) and aircraft). Tools such as group discussions, team task analysis, team task
simulation and feedback should be used.
CRM principles should be integrated into relevant parts of flight crew training and oper-
ations including checklists, brieﬁngs, abnormal and emergency procedures.
CRM training should address hazards and risks identiﬁed by the operator’s management
system described in ORO.GEN.200.
Whenever practicable, the compliance-based approach concerning CRM training may be
substituted by a competency-based approach such as evidence-based training. In this
context, CRM training should be characterised by a performance orientation, with emphasis
on standards of performance and their measurement, and the development of training to the
speciﬁed performance standards.
One of the strengths of the CRM approach is that the training content is based on
underlying scientiﬁc evidence from psychology, physiology or other relevant dis-
ciplines (Kanki et al. 2010). Thus it strives to continually develop and foster
evidence-based practice. Another fundamental principle of CRM is that the training
content should be designed to address current operational issues and to reflect
learning from adverse events and near misses. These are both illustrated in the
section below.
2Joint Aviation Authorities (editors’ note).
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6.3.1 Startle Effects
One example of this process of incorporating learning from adverse events into
CRM training relates to the Air France accident (2009). An Airbus (AF447) crashed
into the Atlantic Ocean when flying between Rio de Janeiro and Paris (BEA 2012).
One of the contributing factors to the accident was that the pilots had apparently
become startled by rapid changes in aircraft state. The EASA (2015, p. 5) guidance,
mentioned above, addresses this issue.
(3) Resilience development
CRM training should address the main aspects of resilience development. The training
should cover:
(i) Mental flexibility
Flight crew should be trained to:
(A) understand that mental flexibility is necessary to recognise critical changes;
(B) reflect on their judgement and adjust it to the unique situation;
(C) avoid ﬁxed prejudices and over-reliance on standard solutions; and
(D) remain open to changing assumptions and perceptions.
(ii) Performance adaptation
Flight crew should be trained to:
(A) mitigate frozen behaviours, overreactions and inappropriate hesitation; and
(B) adjust actions to current conditions.
(4) Surprise and startle effect
CRM training should address unexpected, unusual and stressful situations. The training
should cover:
(i) surprises and startle effects; and
(ii) management of abnormal and emergency situations, including:
(A) the development and maintenance of the capacity to manage crew resources;
(B) the acquisition and maintenance of adequate automatic behavioural responses; and
(C) recognising the loss and re-building situation awareness and control.” (p. 5)
These additions to CRM training had to be implemented by European operators
by October 2016. This is an excellent example of how fundamental training for a
professional group is continually reviewed and revised (in this case by an inter-
national regulatory body) to take into account emerging issues relating to safety that
have not previously been recognised to this degree.
As mentioned above, research evidence is used to develop the content of CRM
training and this has also been true for the startle effect phenomenon. When EASA
were reviewing their European CRM guidance, speciﬁc research ﬁndings on startle
effects were sought and considered. In the USA, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) commissioned research into this phenomenon (e.g. Rivera
et al. 2014) and on the more general effects of acute stress on aircrew performance
(Dismukes et al. 2015). There are only a limited number of studies but these have
shown individual variation in response and recovery patterns, as well as pilots’
6 Enhancing Safety Performance: Non-technical Skills … 49
awareness of this effect (Martin et al. 2015, 2016). And of course, startle effects are
not peculiar to pilots. Recent studies in healthcare indicate similar patterns of
reaction to unexpected events with concomitant delays in decision making and
responsive action during resuscitation (Lu et al. 2015).
6.3.2 CRM Beyond the Flightdeck
The CRM/non-technical skills approach has now extended into many other occu-
pations, including the mariners and ship engineers; railway workers, miners, sys-
tems analysts (Flin et al. 2008, 2014). In healthcare, there has been particular
interest from members of operating theatre teams with non-technical skill sets
developed for anaesthetists (ANTS); scrub nurses (SPLINTS); anaesthetic practi-
tioners (ANTS-AP) and surgeons (NOTSS). There are now training courses on
non-technical skills provided for these occupations and the Royal Australasian
College of Surgeons incorporated the NOTSS framework into their new profes-
sional standards (Flin et al. 2015). As suggested above, this shows how an
increased emphasis on behaviours targeted to improve safety (via a non-technical
skills approach) can be adopted as part of existing professional development.
The main objective of this CRM/ NTS training and assessment has always been
to improve safety/reduce accidents, hence the behavioural rating scales tools to
measure performance on non-technical skills are phrased in the language of safety.
For example, in the NOTECHS system for pilots (van Avaermaete and Kruijsen
1998; O’Connor et al. 2002), the scale descriptors use explanatory terms such as
‘behaviour directly endangered flight safety’ or ‘behaviour enhances flight safety’
for very poor and good performance respectively. But the behavioural examples
(markers) in such systems relate not to speciﬁc safety-related activities but to
normal task operations. Thus the underlying premise is that better demonstration of
skills such as leadership, teamwork, decision making during task execution will
beneﬁt safety. The medical professionals who developed non-technical skills
frameworks and associated behavioural rating systems (e.g. ANTS, NOTSS) have
adopted the same type of scale descriptors (Flin et al. 2015), in this case with the
purpose of emphasising that patient safety is of paramount importance.
Following the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig (2010) in the Gulf
of Mexico that killed 11 workers and injured a further 50, as well as creating an
enormous marine pollution event (Report to the President 2011), the offshore oil
and gas industry became interested in applying CRM to enhance safety (Flin et al.
2014). Social scientists’ analyses of the accident show clearly how failures in
non-technical skills could have contributed to the trajectory of this event (Hopkins
2012; Reader and O’Connor 2014; Roberts et al. 2015b). In order to design cus-
tomised training for drillers and other well control specialists, detailed task analyses
are required to pinpoint the most important non-technical skills that can help to
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protect the safety of the well (Roberts et al. 2015a). In a number of drilling com-
panies, these skills are being taught alongside the technical skills of well control,
especially where there are simulation facilities available that allow for demon-
stration and feedback.
The evaluation literature on CRM and safety outcomes is somewhat limited in
aviation (low accident rates offer insufﬁcient outcome data) although there have
been meta-analyses (e.g. O’Connor et al. 2008). The more recent introduction of
non-technical skills/CRM to the world of healthcare means that as a technique it is
being scrutinised by a new level of rigour, given medical professionals’ concern
with treatment efﬁcacy and willingness to measure error rates and outcomes. Thus
there is an emerging database of studies examining the relationships between
technical skills, non-technical skills, error and safety or other performance metrics.
These generally indicate positive, if patchy, relationships (Hull et al. 2012) but there
is an emerging message that focussing on improving the non-technical skills
required for both routine and abnormal task activities can improve safety.
In the following section, I consider a second approach that is being adopted by
some companies which is not just to consider behaviours but also to foster par-
ticular attitudes or ‘mind sets’ that will drive the choice of behaviours that should
enhance safety. This is another approach to building safety professionalism into
everyday task activities, and the mental state in question is called ‘chronic unease’.
6.4 Chronic Unease
In a work environment that has few accidents, even though there are signiﬁcant
hazards present, there is a likelihood that the risks are underestimated leading to a
false sense of comfort or complacency. A report by Cass Business School (2011),
investigated major corporate crises (explosions, ﬁres, product-related and supply
chain crises, and IT3 problems) and identiﬁed failures at board level in these
organisations. There was an inability to recognise potential risks and engage with
them, a tendency to ask fewer questions when things were going well and not
recognising changes in the corporate environment.
Recent industrial interest in applying the concept of ‘chronic unease’ to man-
agerial and operational thinking on safety matters is an attempt to address this type
of problem. The concept comes from the literature on ‘high reliability organisa-
tions’ (HRO). A key HRO characteristic is the lack of complacency about risks. For
instance, with regard to the structural failures that caused the Alexander Keilland
drilling rig accident in Norway, Weick (1987, p. 119) commented
Part of the mind-set for reliability requires a chronic suspicion that small deviations may
enlarge, a sensitivity that may encourage a more dynamic view of reliability.
3Information Technology (editors’ note).
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The term ‘chronic unease’ was introduced by Reason (1997) to capture ten-
dencies of wariness towards risks, thus as a contrast to complacency. He described
it as resulting from an absence of negative events, leading ‘people [to]forget to be
afraid’ (p. 39). The Oxford English dictionary deﬁnes ‘unease’ as a form of dis-
comfort and distress, related to strain and representing a feeling of concern.
In a similar vein, the HRO literature discusses alertness and good management
of risks under the label of ‘mindfulness’ in organisations. Weick and Sutcliffe
(2006) describe mindful organisations as:
1. dealing with risks by investing substantial resources, both ﬁnancial and
attentional,
2. early detection of issues,
3. pre-occupation with failure,
4. reluctance to simplify,
5. sensitivity to nuances that can lead to failure,
6. commitment to resilience and
7. willingness to defer to experts.
The resilience literature uses the term ‘restless mind’ to label awareness that
things can go wrong and alertness to weak signals (Westrum 2008). Likewise,
Pidgeon (2012) writes of ‘safety imagination’ to describe inadequate appreciation
of risk in relation to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan in 2011.
My research group had been studying managers’ safety leadership and safety
commitment (Agnew and Flin 2014; Flin 2006; Fruhen et al. 2014) and we were
sponsored by a multinational oil and gas company to work on a study of chronic
unease in managers. This company had already developed safety materials for
operational staff which emphasised the importance of having a sense of respectful
unease for ever-present risks in the work environment and conﬁrmed the impor-
tance of vigilance and attention to weak signals. The focus of our project was on
how more senior managers might experience chronic unease, how that could
influence their behaviour and whether they felt this was beneﬁcial for safety and for
the business more generally.
Despite the prevalence of the term ‘chronic unease’ in the high reliability
organisation (HRO) literature, there was limited evidence to enable a deﬁnition or
operationalisation of this concept. To develop a better understanding of chronic
unease, we conducted a literature search using this term (Fruhen et al. 2014). We
only found descriptions of chronic unease in 9 articles. These were coded resulting
in the identiﬁcation of ﬁve themes: pessimism, propensity to worry, vigilance,
requisite imagination and flexible thinking. From the descriptions in the literature
and with reference to related conceptualisations, we proposed the following
components:
• Pessimism is a disposition that drives individuals to anticipate failures and
expect negative events and therefore may promote chronic unease about safety.
Pessimism is not concerned with emotions and somatic reactions, but rather
represents an attitude towards the future.
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• Propensity to worry is a tendency towards experiencing an emotional reaction
with regard to possible failure. This could be characterised as a personality trait
(worry regularly about many things) or as a more transient state (to worry about
a particular event). It is a subcomponent of anxiety, described as speciﬁc to
cognition that is characterised by concern about future events.
• Vigilance is usually deﬁned in terms of an observer’s ability to maintain
attentional focus and to remain alert to stimuli over prolonged periods of time.
Thus it concerns the detection of signals in the environment.
• Requisite imagination was deﬁned by Adamski and Westrum (2003, p. 195)
the ﬁne art of anticipating what might go wrong.
It is not primarily concerned with the exploration of current states of problems,
but with the ability to project their future development.
• Flexible thinking relates to creative problem solving which typically involves
divergent thinking. We suggested that chronic unease promotes this mode of
cognition.
We proposed a preliminary conceptualisation of chronic unease based on these
attributes, arguing that this particular mental state may be desirable for managers in
relation to the control of risks. Desirable because the feelings of unease may lead
them to be more attentive to risk information and to incorporate a safety dimension
into their operational decision making.
In a second study, we carried out semi-structured interviews with 27 senior
managers from several companies in the energy sector (Fruhen and Flin 2016). The
aim of the study was to determine if the ﬁve components identiﬁed in the literature
review would be evident in the managers’ responses when discussing their safety
leadership practices. We were also interested in how a sense of chronic unease
would affect the managers’ behaviours. Content analysis of the interview transcripts
identiﬁed flexible thinking most frequently, followed by pessimism, propensity to
worry, vigilance and requisite imagination. Flexible thinking was frequently also
coded as a behaviour, suggesting it to be a partially observable response to chronic
unease. Other behaviours that emerged as related to chronic unease were demon-
strating safety commitment, transformational and transactional leadership styles,
and seeking information. Chronic unease was described as having positive effects
on safety, positive and negative effects on team interaction and negative effects on
business and the managers’ personal outcomes. We concluded that the ﬁve com-
ponents provide a basis for the measurement of chronic unease and suggested
behaviours and responses that should be considered in its future investigation.
Figure 6.1 provides a proposed model of how the components and associated
behaviours might be related.
In terms of increasing the professionalization of safety in managers, it is sug-
gested that attention should be paid to these underlying characteristics and attitu-
dinal states (‘mind-set for reliability’), as well as considering the related behaviours.
The extent to whether ‘chronic unease’ in managers can be developed is still to be
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determined. Managerial safety training which endeavours to increase risk aware-
ness, to demonstrate the personal consequences for managers of having a major
accident and to show how companies can become complacent is essentially trying
to increase a sense of unease.
When introducing the topic of chronic unease, I am often asked—‘So how much
chronic unease is desirable?’ Certainly a high level of chronic unease for safety
could have negative consequences for individuals who are consumed by worry and
constantly fearful of catastrophic events on their worksites. Of course, any extreme
mental state can be harmful; at an abnormal level there could be reduced
well-being, stress and even clinical anxiety and depression. Thus we proposed that
the relationship between chronic unease and efﬁcacy in safety management prob-
ably has a curvilinear nature (Flin and Fruhen 2015). Too little unease and the
resulting complacency could mean that warning signals are ignored, ambiguities are
marginalized, there is no systematic search for negative indicators, and adverse
consequences are rarely considered. Too much unease and the manager could be
disabled by anxiety with consequent deleterious effects on decision making, action
and mental health. At the optimal level, which will be individually determined, the
sense of chronic unease about organisational safety prompts a continued search for
hidden threats, the extended consideration of ambiguities and anomalies, and the
appreciation of disconﬁrming evidence.
This suggestion of a curvilinear relationship between for chronic unease and
managerial performance is based on Janis and Mann’s (1977) conflict model of
stress and decision making, where they described coping patterns in decision
conflict situations (i.e. ambiguity about the best option) with distinctive levels of
stress. They describe various states including ‘hypervigilance’ where there is
recognition of the serious risks in the alternative courses of action. In this case the
stress level is extreme (cf. high chronic unease) creating a state akin to panic with
the individual preoccupied with the threatened losses. Resulting behaviours can
include impulsive actions, vacillation and simplistic, repetitive thinking. We argued
Fig. 6.1 Proposed model of the influence of chronic unease on managers’ behaviours (Fruhen and
Flin 2016). Reprinted from the Journal of Risk Research with the permission of Taylor and Francis
54 R. Flin
(Flin and Fruhen 2015) that such high levels of anxiety might exist because a
manager is not well-suited to the job, or has insufﬁcient knowledge and support.
Alternatively, such high anxiety could be a strong indication that there are
uncontrolled risks and that continuing with workplace operations could result in an
accident.
It was suggested that the desirable level of chronic unease for safety is in the
mid-range, perhaps this could be called ‘a modicum of unease’. This is similar to
what Janis and Mann called vigilance which was associated with a moderate level
of stress. In this case, they described the decision maker recognizing that there are
serious risks imbued in competing alternatives, but having conﬁdence about the
likelihood of ﬁnding an adequate solution in the available time. Clearly there would
be marked individual differences in what level of unease would produce discomfort
in managers and the types of risks that would most concern them. The professional
implications of chronic unease may be more pertinent to organisational selection
practices than to safety training.
6.5 Conclusion
As Gilbert (see Introduction) points out in his opposition statement regarding the
ineffectiveness of safety training, there is a need to make a ﬁner grained assessment
of exactly where there appears to be no or minimal return on investment. It is likely
that many safety training courses such as on hazard awareness, use of protective
techniques, event analysis, risk protection measures, do deliver the anticipated
developments in knowledge, skills and attitudes. Safety training courses in CRM
and non-technical skills can also broaden the range of risk awareness, especially to
show how social or intrapersonal factors can increase the risk level during task
execution. These courses can also focus on speciﬁc methods for altering beha-
viours, for example, relating to speaking up, listening, conducting handovers,
problem solving, task brieﬁng which can have longer term effects on hazard
awareness levels, as well as shifting norms of acceptable behaviour to improve the
safety culture. However, the evidence on effectiveness for both technical and
non-technical safety training can be limited and one component of increasing the
professionalism of safety may be a requirement for organisations to spend more
time and money evaluating the longer term impact of their safety training and other
safety interventions. This would require baseline data to be gathered on knowledge,
skills and attitudes prior to the training programme and more use of randomised
control designs to enable a robust assessment of treatment effects. To enhance the
professionalism of safety, whether by developing safety professionals or increasing
safety awareness and related skills of operational staff, a strong evidence base is
required to determine what should be trained and how the skills can be developed
and maintained. In addition, more attention may need to be devoted to personal
attributes, such as having a sense of chronic unease when dealing with hazardous
activities. In summary, addressing both workplace, on-task behaviours
6 Enhancing Safety Performance: Non-technical Skills … 55
(non-technical skills), as well as underlying attitudes to operational risks (chronic
unease), can help to build protective skills for safety into the professional job
repertoire.
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